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To the Right Honourable

The E A R L of B * * * .

I N W H I C H

The Causes and Consequences of the
War between Great Britain and Spain,
are fully considered ;

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The Conduct of a certain Right Honourable
Gentleman further examined.

L O N D O N :

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A T H I R D

LETTER, &c.

MY LORD,

IT is with the utmost reluctance that I intrude upon your lordship with a new address; but the happy operation of my two former letters upon the public, under the sanction of your lordship's name, emboldens me to undertake a third. I am, my Lord, perhaps the only political writer in this kingdom that ever wrote with the professed design of abolishing parties in politics. I had, some days ago, the infinite satisfaction of reflecting that parties were coalesced, or upon the point of being so; but, unhappily, the only

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event that ought most loudly to call for public unanimity has revived our animosities. My Lord, was there not a single man in his majesty's dominions to second me, I would speak and publish my opinion, that there is a degree of popularity that may be dangerous to a free people ; and that there may be such a thing as an *accidental*, nay, an *unmerited* popularity ; I say there may be, for I hope none such exists in this country. But, my Lord, the writer of these lines is old enough to have seen such a popularity existing, founded on false, foolish, and frivolous grounds. He has seen the people of England do every thing but adore, and scarcely abstaining even from adoring the advocates for a Spanish war. He must, at the same time, do them the justice to say, that they recovered from their phrenzy, and that they as heartily despised, as they had before madly idolized, those *patriots*, as it was then fashionable to call every man who had not coolness enough

enough to think for himself or to feel for the public.

I remember, my Lord, the time when a certain admiral was, if possible, more popular than a late minister ; but he lived to be despised, and even his own friends blushed at their mistaken partiality in his favour. At that time, this admiral might have raised a rebellion ; and the divisions that happened on his account in the cabinet, in the parliament, and all over the nation, effected very little less than a rebellion ; nor shall I at all decline saying, that, at last, they virtually produced one ; because nothing is more certain than that the enemies of this happy constitution were encouraged to take arms in the year 1745, from the opinion they had of our divisions.

In short, my Lord, amongst a free, a brave, and a generous people, such as the English are, popularity may be acquired upon very easy terms ; and the right honourable gentleman, who is now the idol

of the people, has perhaps the cheapest bargain of it that any Englishman ever had ; and has obtained it in the most unaccountable manner. The *vir justus et tenax propositi* ; that is, the man who proceeds on the principles he set out with in life, who is as unmoved by prosperous, as he is undaunted by adverse, circumstances, used to be the venerable character with a free people. The popularity of a man who shifts his practice and principles according to events, is a phænomenon reserved for these times.

A man virtuously popular, my Lord, will disclaim all imputed merit, and all influence that arises merely from mistaken opinion. A true patriot will be glad of every opportunity to undeceive his countrymen in their absurdities ; because, however well intentioned he may be, and however well placed their confidence in him is, they may from mistaken motives, place the same confidence in an unworthy object. The right honourable
gentleman,

gentleman, therefore, and his friends, if they really are patriots, never can take amiss any attempt that is made to set the public right, as to the merits of his popularity; and if he is possessed of any, merely by imputation, he will resign it as willingly as he would an inheritance to which he has no title either in law or conscience.

Surmises, my Lord, strengthened by a late paragraph in our Gazette, indicating the abrupt departure of our minister from the court of Madrid, has revived the popular cry of a certain right honourable gentleman's political infallibility. All his friends are now up in arms, sheltered under the approaching war, and are hurling their defiances against all who ever dared to question his conduct. I happen to be singular enough, to think his conduct to be quite out of the question, whether we have or have not a Spanish war. It is true, if the letter published in his name is really his, he has told us that his political

tical abdication was owing to a difference of sentiments with the rest of the king's servants, with regard to what Spain had done to our prejudice.

Your lordship is sensible, that there was not a servant the king had, who differed with the right honourable gentleman, as to the facts he urged at the C—l B—d: nay, I will venture to say that some who were there, and who were the keenest in opposing him, had as bad an opinion, as he had, of the designs of Spain; but, my Lord, a king of Great-Britain cannot proceed like a king of France or Prussia, upon self-conviction merely. He cannot say, “I am satisfied, I have provocation, and therefore I will go to war.” His majesty has proceeded as a king of England ought to do, by leaving nothing undone that can create in the breasts of neighbouring people and princes, or what is still more material in those of his own subjects, the least doubt as to the propriety of his own conduct,

conduct, and the injustice of that of Spain.

The most clamorous of the right honourable gentleman's friends cannot, therefore, impute to him the smallest merit of his having foreseen or foretold what had escaped the observation of others. There was no debate as to facts : the only question was, Are we to proceed like lawless ruffians, or in a regular manner ? “ It is possible, said the right honourable gentleman's opponents, that Spain may have done so or so ; and it is but too probable, that she has in her head ill designs against this nation ; but have they been sufficiently manifested to justify our hurrying all at once into hostilities ? ” This, my Lord, when we consider the temper, the state, and the situation of this nation, at that time, was no unreasonable suggestion, nor do I believe there was any member who sat at the C——l B——d, who did not more than suspect what has since happened

happened with regard to Spain, and who did not expect that a war must be the consequence sooner or later. In the first letter I had the honour to address to your lordship, far from entering into the truth or falshood of allegations, I took the liberty to say, that the people of England thought a Spanish war was too good news to be true. The people of England, my Lord, wished for a Spanish war, and it was to them the most desirable event that could have happened: but, my Lord, I wish it had happened two years ago, if our grievances are of that standing; for I must be of opinion, that we shall enter upon a Spanish war, now, under greater disadvantages than could have attended any period for these fifty years past; and, my Lord, I own I must be so unfashionable as to think that if such a war could have been avoided with any tolerable degree of decency or dignity on our parts, it ought to have been avoided.

It is not, my Lord, for a private man

or writer, to call upon the right honourable gentleman for his reasons, why, if he was furnished with the proper documents, that rendered a Spanish war inevitable, he should have outlate the only time, when we could have entered upon it with success. Did the right honourable gentleman, before he resigned the seals of his office, say to his master, or the rest of the ministry, “ You are injured by Spain ; you must come to an eclaireissement, and if she shall refuse to give you a categorical answer, you ought to declare war.”

I cannot, my Lord, help thinking, that this would have been a proceeding far more deserving the name of patriotic, than that which the right honourable gentleman has observed. He caught the advantage of the very nick of time, when forms interfered with substance ; and he was for arresting the Spanish ships, before we had made an affidavit, or taken out a writ. Far be it, my Lord,

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from me to question the right honourable gentleman's integrity ; but, upon my word, I cannot but think it extremely odd, that he did not suggest to his majesty and the ministry, the reasons why they ought to enter into a Spanish war, before their flota and galleons arrived in Old Spain. There is not a man so poorly conversant in history, as to be ignorant that the arrival of their galleons and flota is the crisis of all their deliberations ; and that for seventy years past, the Spaniards, before that arrival, were always humble, and after it, insolent. Now, my Lord, let us join issue with the right honourable gentleman's popularity. Was he not furnished with every fact twelve months ago that he is in possession of at present, that could justify our going to war with Spain ; but did he ever before the tenth of September last, give an intimation that such a war was inevitable, or did he, before the eighth or tenth of the following month,

month, ever in public or in private, declare, that the opposition he met with on that account was the cause of his resolution to resign the seals of his office.

It is, my Lord, impossible to look into thoughts, but common sense must teach any man, that the right honourable gentleman had no more reason for resigning on the fifth of October last, than he had on the fifth of October preceding. Forms amongst nations are deemed to be essential. A word and a blow, it is true, has the vogue amongst us bold Britons ; but we may find it difficult to make other nations adopt the same laconic method. Had the right honourable gentleman, even twelve months before he resigned the seals of his office, declared his resolution not to keep them, unless we went to war with Spain, we could not at that very time have entered into war, but we must have proceeded in the manner we have done.

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This nation, however, must have been greatly benefited by gaining a few months. After forms were over, hostilities might have commenced, and the capture of the flota or the galleons, might have enabled us to pay part of the unjust reckoning our enemies have charged us with. The case, however, was far different. The only person who was positive the Spanish war was inevitable, stood aloof. He dallied till we slipped the opportunity ; nor did he once declare himself on the subject, till the Spaniards got home their treasures, and became in a condition to bid us defiance.

What has been the consequence? Every art of popularity, and various are the arts employed to support it, has been employed with the giddy vulgar, to make them believe that the right honourable gentleman's prescience and omniscience has been treated with undeserved neglect ; and every throat is now open to tell us, that he foresaw more than all the nation
besides

besides did. The meaning of all this is, that England must be ruined if the right honourable gentleman does not resume the seals with as great a plenitude of power, as he shall please to carve out for himself. My Lord, I cannot help being of opinion, that they who have had the honour of conducting the affairs of the ministry, since the right honourable gentleman retired from them, have done the very thing that he would have done, or ought to have done, had he continued in post. They have lost no time in demanding that categorical answer, which he ought to have demanded, but did not, three years ago. My Lord, I must look upon those three years as so much mispent time to Great Britain ; because, if we are now to enter into a war with Spain, we do it with the disadvantage of their being ten millions richer, and we forty millions poorer than either of us would have been three years ago. But, my Lord, I am afraid a still worse consequence follows,
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and that the credit of our arms, and even of this nation, was much higher two years ago than it is at present. The right honourable gentleman and his friends can best account for the causes of this reverse; and if it was brought upon us by their conduct, they shewed themselves the most able of all politicians, in clapping the collar of their own manufacturing upon the shoulders of others. A little review of our present situation must convince us of their wisdom, in providing for their own safety at the expence of that of the nation.

Supposing, my Lord, the right honourable gentleman and his friends to be at this very time in possession of the power they held some months ago, and that some honest well meaning English gentleman should unfortunately ask them, “Where are the allies of Great Britain; where has she a friend to her back?” I remember, my Lord, the time when a minister not being able to answer that question, was
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thought a sufficient foundation of a motion, for removing him from his majesty's presence and councils for ever. That minister, my Lord, did not pride himself upon the conquests he had planned ; and the eternal objection to his administration was, that during it we were sixty-five, or sixty-six millions in debt. The public debt is now double that sum ; and, as matters go on, we must triple it. Now, my Lord, let me sit down with a reader equally cool as candid, and examine whether the public of Great Britain has received an equivalent for such an immense addition to her national debt. But to do this coolly and dispassionately, it is necessary for me to suppose this nation to be in that state which the right honourable gentleman's conduct removed out of our sight, when he rejected the terms that were offered by France. Let us then compare that state with our present, deeply involved as we are in a war with one great power, on the eve of one with another, and dreaded or hated by all Europe.

I shall, not for this purpose, have any retrospect to any part of the right honourable gentleman's conduct, as a minister, that made a war, the only expedient we could pursue to vindicate our national honour. I shall confine myself to the period between this and November 25, 1759, when the duke of Brunswick transmitted from the Hague to the ministers of France, Vienna, and Russia, their Britannic and Prussian majesties pacific declaration, and which was printed in the London Gazette, of the 4th of December the same year. It is remarkable, my Lord, that at this time, Great Britain may be said to have been in the zenith of her glory. She had conquered Canada ; she had destroyed the French marine ; and some months before, the bonfires for one victory were scarcely expiring, when others for other victories were lighted up. Notwithstanding this flattering prospect, every breast that entertained sentiments of humanity, was pleased to observe his late majesty's moderation, when he declared

But no care being taken in the autumn of 1706, to send over proper reinforcements to the assistance of king Charles, Philip began to recover strength; and in April, 1707, the Duke of Berwick, who commanded his forces, obtained so complete a victory at Almanza, and pursued it with so much spirit and diligence, that before the end of the year, the face of affairs was entirely changed in that kingdom.

It is indeed true, that after this the allies made considerable progress, and in the month of August, 1710, gained the battle of Saragossa, which opened a passage for Charles the III^d. to Madrid, into which city he made his public entry in the middle of the following month; but the dispositions of the Spaniards were now changed, and they adhered so firmly to king Philip, that, after the close of that year, King Charles was again, after losing a battle, driven back into Catalonia.

In the month of April, 1711, died the emperor Joseph, and thereby left King Charles the III^d. sole heir male, of the House of Austria, which extremely changed the state of affairs, because it appeared now equally dangerous to give the Spanish, as well as Imperial dominions to this prince, or to leave them to a branch of the House of Bourbon; and there remained

no expedient that could be thought of to prevent the one or other of these events.

The House of Austria was at that time in possession of the Spanish Netherlands, and all the dominions that had belonged to that crown on the continent of Italy, which gave an opportunity to the French court to insinuate to the new ministry in England, the necessity, as well as expediency, of putting an end to so long a war, upon terms agreeable to the first scheme of the grand alliance; and this in the end brought on the peace of Utrecht, which was concluded in 1713.

By this treaty King Philip yielded to Great Britain the town and castle of Gibraltar, and the island of Minorca for ever; the kingdom of Naples, the dutchy of Milan, and the rest of the Spanish dominions in Italy, together with the island of Sardinia and the Low Countries, to the Emperor, Charles the VIth; and the island of Sicily, with the title of King, to the Duke of Savoy.

It must be allowed that the treaty of Utrecht was liable to great exceptions; but, however, the end of the great alliance was, in some measure, answered by it. The crowns of France and Spain were divided, the power of the house of Austria considerably augmented, and the balance
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of power in Europe in some measure settled. But, notwithstanding, this King Philip was not left in quiet possession of his dominions, to which the emperor still kept up his claim; and the principality of Catalonia, and the island of Majorca, tho' evacuated by the Austrian troops, refused to submit, and were not reduced without a great deal of trouble and much effusion of blood; so that the force of Spain seemed, at the conclusion of this war, exhausted to such a degree, that there was not much to be feared from her, notwithstanding her being left in possession of a prince of the House of Bourbon.

It was the policy of Lewis XIV. to match both his grandsons, the Dukes of Burgundy and Anjou, into the House of Savoy; and although, in the first instance, his policy seemed to be disappointed, since the Duke of Savoy took part with the allies throughout the whole war, yet his daughter, the Queen of Spain, by her engaging behaviour, acquired the affection of the Spanish nobility, and thereby contributed not a little to maintain her consort on the throne.

She died the 14th of February, 1714, and left behind her two sons; Don Lewis, born in 1707, who became king of Spain by the resignation of his father; and Don

Ferdinand, born 23d of September 1713, the late king of Spain. By her decease, Philip was left at liberty to strengthen his interest by a second marriage, which he concluded in a few months, with the princess Elizabeth Farnese, daughter of the duke of Parma, and heiress not only of that dutchy, but also expectant heiress of Tuscany; which marriage was contracted with a view to revive the interest of the house of Bourbon in Italy, which had been in a manner extinguished by the late peace.

The new Queen brought her father's minister into power, who was afterwards well known by the title of cardinal Alberoni. This man, who must be allowed a great genius, projected the revival of the Spanish power, and the recovery of the Italian dominions, at a time when the former was thought very difficult, and the latter appeared totally impracticable.

It is true, that he did not absolutely succeed in this scheme, but it is no less true, that he came nearer to it than any body could have imagined; for he put the affairs of Spain into such order, that she had fleets and armies capable of alarming her neighbours, with which he actually obtained possession of Sardinia, and would have recovered Sicily, if the naval power
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of Britain had not interposed, and given such a blow at Messina to his Catholick Majesty's maritime forces, as ruined all his schemes at once ; and, which was still more, obliged his master to part with him, and to accede to the quadruple alliance, which was set on foot to supply the defects of the treaty of Utrecht, and to fix the tranquility of Europe upon a more solid basis.

By this alliance, Sardinia was given to the Duke of Savoy instead of Sicily ; but at the same time, it was agreed that Don Carlos, his Catholick Majesty's first born son by his second wife, should succeed to Parma and Tuscany. In 1721, a marriage was concluded between the French king Lewis XV. and the Infanta of Spain, which however did not take effect ; but another concluded at the same time did, whereby Lewis, Prince of the Asturias, espoused the fourth daughter of the duke of Orleans, regent of France. Upon the death of this last mentioned prince, it is believed that his Catholick Majesty entertained some hopes of returning into France, and assuming the government of that kingdom in the name of his nephew ; but whatever his motive was, on the 15th of January 1724, he actually resigned the kingdom to his son Don Lewis, Prince of
Asturias

Asturias ; who is allowed to have been possessed of as great abilities as could be expected in one of his years, whose manners as well as birth endeared him to the Spaniards ; and who, in the beginning of his administration, gave great hopes of proving a wise and beneficent prince. But, on the 30th of August following, he died in the eighteenth year of his age, to the inexpressible grief of his father as well as of his subjects.

Upon the demise of Don Lewis, it was judged that in the natural course of things, his brother Don Ferdinand, should have succeeded him in the throne ; but the fear of minority, and perhaps some other reasons, induced the Spaniards to prevail upon Philip V. to resume the government, which he did, but with reluctance ; whether real or feigned is hard to determine.

He applied himself very closely to business, and being extremely provoked at the sending back of the Infanta from France, he began to meditate new and strange designs ; or rather such were infused into his mind by the Queen and his ministers. It is generally believed, and not without good grounds, that Cardinal Alberoni, who was then at Rome, contrived that amazing scene which alarmed all Europe : at least it is certain, that it

was managed and transacted by one of his creatures ; a man born to make a figure in unquiet times, and who, as he deserted the service of his country, no other prince ought to have relied on.

This was the famous Ripperda, who negociated the treaty of Vienna, by which the Emperor Charles VI. and King Philip, in whose quarrel such rivers of blood have been shed, and such immense treasures expended, entered into a close alliance for the mutual support of each other's interest, against those very persons who had sacrificed so much for the aggrandizement of both. The true motives to this strange alliance are by many held to remain still secret ; but it seems to be pretty evident, that the views of the Emperor were immediate, and those of Spain, more remote and distant.

The former thought that by this means he should establish his Ostend Company, by which he hoped to revive the trade of the Low-Countries, though at the expence of his old friends the Dutch ; the latter, consented to the aggrandizing the Imperial power, from the flattering expectation that Don Carlos, by marrying the eldest Arch-Dutcheß, at present Empress and Queen of Hungary, would become successor of that branch of the House of Austria,

Austria, as himself had been of the other, by which he seemed to renounce his engagements with France.

This strange turn was more extraordinary, considering the time in which it happened, when both France and the maritime powers, were labouring to bring about in a rational and effectual manner, such an accommodation as these Monarchs hastily, and inconsiderately clapped up, with views only to their private advantage. To ballance this Vienna alliance, France, the maritime powers, and Prussia, entered into the famous treaty of Hanover, in order to provide for their own interests, which they thought could never be safe, while this unnatural conjunction subsisted.

The Emperor and the Catholic king, seemed determined to persist in the execution of such schemes, from whence they expected to derive such mighty advantages; but the Hanover allies took their measures so effectually, that they were obliged, after some fruitless attempts, to submit to the old method of determining all differences by a negociation, which produced the congress at Soissons.

This congress was opened the 14th of July 1728, but to very little purpose, except that it served to shew the ascendancy which the French minister cardinal Fleury had

which, I am told, was disclaimed by his Prussian majesty's order, but I believe all England, and all Europe are convinced, that it was authentic ; nor do I remember that the right honourable gentleman, whose business it certainly was to disclaim it, if it was not authentic, ever received his late majesty's commands for so doing. It is certain, that France did publish it as being authentic ; and it is as certain, that the dignity of the right honourable gentleman's office could not have been tarnished, had he signified to the public, by the king his master's orders, that no such letter ever was received. I must, therefore, my Lord, suppose, though I will not affirm, that such a letter once had an existence. The consequence of this supposition is, that there was a time when his late majesty thought that the interest of his electoral, as well as regal, dominions required his withdrawing from a German war ; but that the tribunitial power of the Veto,

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which his Prussian majesty had acquired by treaty, prevented him. Pray, my Lord, could a British minister have a stronger specimen, that it was our great ally's determined resolution, to maintain his claim of our having taken him for better and worse ; at least, while the term of the treaty subsisted ? It is true, this nation, at that time, was next to intoxicated with our Prussian alliance ; but, my Lord, I am singular enough to think that the judgment of a great minister ought not to be borne down by a popular current, however strong it may run. A few minutes of cool reflection must have made him sensible, that his Britannic majesty's views, and those of his Prussian majesty, were incompatible, and he ought to have felicitated himself upon the near prospect he had of rendering them entirely independent of one another. Instead of that, engagement was heaped upon engagement, and one treaty tacked to another, till our interest became inextricable ;

tricable ; and the convulsions of our ally caught such hold of us in his agonizing moments, that it appears as if we must now swim or sink together. Can it be said that this implication, this intricacy, of concerns with a power, that, to all eternity, never can serve Great-Britain in the most minute interest she has, has been effected by a firm patriot and a British conduct ? Let us figure to ourselves the worst prospect we can figure, and that after the convention at Hastenbeck, Great Britain had shook herself loose of all continental connections ; would she in such a case, have possessed a single foot of territory less than she does now ? Yes, says the right honourable gentleman and his friends, Quebec and Guadaloupe were conquered in Germany. My Lord, the suffering such a paradox to escape uncensured, is perhaps the greatest evidence that any minister ever brought of his triumph over the understanding of the people of Great Britain.

On the 26th of June, 1759, the whole embarkation destined against Quebec arrived at the isle of Orleans. The French, about that time, had placed their whole resource for the recovery of their affairs upon an invasion of Great-Britain, which did not suffer them to spare a single ship to the assistance of their American colonies. They had likewise, at that very time, such a superiority of force in Germany, that it was every day expected the British army under prince Ferdinand must surrender prisoners at discretion; and nothing but the miraculous event of the battle of Minden could have prevented their doing so. There was but the space of thirty-five days between that battle and the landing of our troops on the isle of Orleans. The prospect we then had of success, as appears by general Wolfe's letter, was next to none, perhaps less than none; and the French had above 10,000 regular troops in Canada, commanded by two able generals to disappoint all our attempts there.

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It happened, how unaccountably I shall not say, that the army which effected that conquest did not exceed 9000 men. Now, my Lord, let us consider what must have been the consequence, if neither the French nor we had had a single battalion in Germany, at the time when we had 25,000 of our best troops in that country. The French, considering the vast superiority they had over us in Canada, never could have dreamed of sending reinforcements thither; especially when they knew the absolute impossibility of such reinforcements arriving there while we were in full possession of the navigation of the river of St. Laurence. Nothing can illustrate what I here say, better than the unexceptionable authority of general Wolfe himself, who, in the placart he published as commander in chief of the troops of his Britannic majesty on his arrival in the river St. Laurence, in the month of August, 1759, has the following remarkable paragraph: “ The Canadians,

dians, says he, cannot be ignorant of their situation. The English are masters of the river, and blocking up the passages to all succours from Europe. They have, besides, a powerful army on the continent, under the command of general Amherst."

From this pregnant quotation, my Lord, it is extremely plain, that while Mr. Saunders had possession of the river St. Laurence, as the French well knew he had, the sending to Quebec the whole 130,000 men, which they were supposed then to employ in Germany, could have brought no manner of relief to that place ; nor indeed is it possible for one to suggest to himself, as things were then circumstanced, even the shadow of an argument, to prove that there subsisted the most distant connection between our German and our American war.

But to deprive the advocates for war, of all subterfuge from that trite, tho' I am sorry to say it, too prevailing an argument,

ment, as if our maintaining an army in Germany had given us Quebec; let me pursue the other part of the argument I have laid down, which was, (and it is allowing more than ever I heard demanded) that had the seas even been open to France, she had no manner of occasion to send more troops to Canada than she already had there. In Mr. Wolfe's letter, dated from his head-quarters at Montmorenci, in the river St. Laurence, September 2, 1759; he very plainly, and very truly, informs the right honourable gentleman, "that the enemy was not only superior to him in numbers, but that the marquis de Moncalm, the French general, *wisely* depended on the natural strength of the country." He then proceeds in the dispatch as follows: "When, says he, I learned that succours of all kinds had been thrown into Quebec; that five battalions of regular troops, completed from the best inhabitants of the country, some of the troops of the colony, and every Canadian

nadian that was able to bear arms, besides several nations of savages, had taken the field in a very advantageous situation ; I could not flatter myself that I should be able to reduce the place." The remaining part of this dispatch, tho' written by as brave and as judicious a commander as England ever perhaps produced, breathes nothing but despondency. " By the list, says he, of disabled officers, (many of whom are of rank) you may perceive, Sir, that the army is much weakened. By the nature of the river, the most formidable part of this armament is deprived of the power of acting ; yet we have almost the whole force of Canada to oppose. In this situation, there is such a choice of difficulties, that I own myself at a loss how to determine. The affairs of Great Britain, I know, require the most vigorous measures ; but then the courage of a handful of brave men should be exerted only where there is some hope of a favourable event."

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Now, my Lord, if general Wolfe did not impose upon the right honourable gentleman by this intelligence, what had France to apprehend for the safety of Quebec, when general Wolfe arrived in the river of St. Laurence ? It is plain, from his own words, that while he lay there, he was to be considered as a besieger, and the French as the besieged, even before our army faced the walls of Quebec. It is true, the spirit and the intrepidity of the British troops conquered the natural strength of the country ; but it is true, that that conquest neither had nor could have the smallest operation upon the conduct of the French in Europe. It was what they no more expected than they did to be beaten at Minden. Their own public papers proclaimed to all Europe, that they were quite safe with regard to Quebec ; and, indeed, to all human appearance, they well might be so ; and our conquest was owing to a miraculous providence, that

may not again happen in a thousand years ; and which the French never could think of guarding against.

But, my Lord, I believe that the futility of the argument of our having conquered Quebec in Germany admits almost of a demonstration, a degree of evidence that seldom happens in political controversies. Had the French foreseen their danger ; had they apprehended our success, it was not in their power to have sent troops to the relief of Canada, and that for a very plain reason ; because Canada actually could not subsist her own inhabitants. It is notorious, that the humanity and generosity of the British general and officers prevented the Canadians, who surrendered themselves to our subjection, from starving. If the right honourable gentleman or his friends should pretend that France might have sent the means of subsistence along with the troops destined for the relief of Canada, the answer is plain, that the thing itself
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was impossible; or admitting it to be possible, they could not have carried with them provisions for above a fortnight. Upon the whole, therefore, there is not perhaps in all history, a proposition more certain than that our success in Canada must have been the same as it was, tho' we had not had a company of foot in Germany.

This being the case, my Lord, what apology can the conduct of the right honourable gentleman admit of? Far from disowning the fact of having involved us in a German war, which has cost us twenty millions, he glories in it, and has said, in defence of his notorious apostacy from anti-continental measures, that Canada was conquered in Germany. Lamentable must the state of a people's understanding be, who can be brought to swallow such absurdities. Did our having an army of 25,000 men in Germany favour Sir William Johnson's success against Niagara? did it force the French

to abandon Crown Point and Ticonderago? did it level the heights of the river Montmorenci, or bring the Canadians to submit to our government? No, my Lord, those events had not the most remote connection with German operations; and if the right honourable gentleman and his friends deserve praise, it is for putting his defence upon an intelligible, though easily confuted, principle.

We forget, however, all this time, that we either are, or soon shall be, if we proceed as we do, about a *hundred and thirty millions in debt*, ; that the interest of this debt must be paid by the public; that the public cannot pay it but out of the produce of popular industry; and that the right honourable gentleman's measures have cut off the right hand of that industry, by employing almost every fourth able bodied man in the kingdom in war, either by sea or land. It may be a secret to your lordship, and I believe it is so to most of his majesty's servants in high stations,

tions, but it is a most melancholy truth, that a middling labouring man at present, (and by such our manufactories are all carried on) has no trade to pursue equally profitable as that of war. What still makes this truth the more deplorable is, that the profession of a soldier, at least a soldier serving in England, is attended with much less fatigue than that of any manufacturer. A soldier, for I look upon our militia in no other light than as regular troops, when he enlists for three years, which is 1095 days, receives ten guineas, which answers to 802 three-pences and one half-penny. Add this to a soldier's regular pay, together with what he may get by odd jobs, &c. not forgetting the care which the public is obliged to take of his wife and family ; and what life of a common labouring manufacturer is to be compared to his, in the points either of profit or ease ? My lord, I know none ; and there is not a truth more alarming to a British ministry,

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(I mean an honest one) that every encouragement you give to your army subtracts so much from the interest of your state.

Unfortunately does it happen, that this is a time those truths are ridiculed as unreasonable. There is scarcely a family now in Great Britain, be its consideration what it will, from the palace to the cottage, that has not a relation either in the army or the navy. No topic, therefore, is so general as the praises of our brave soldiers and our brave sailors. Every British subject almost is interested in them: but, my lord, was it thus that Britain rose to renown, to dignity, to importance? No, the silent advances of her trade were made when the character of her arms and power was the least conspicuous. We were infatuated enough to rail almost for twenty years against a minister, (I mean Sir Robert Walpole) who kept on foot an army of not so many as 19,000 men. There is not a man of sense
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in England at this time, who recollects the anniversary debates on that head, who does not laugh at the nonsense of the arguments used against the keeping up that army as being dangerous to our liberties; but, my lord, we have not heard a single whisper of that danger, since above ten times that number of Britons have been employed in the purposes of war. To what can this be owing? Had that danger an existence? No. Then what merit can they pretend to, who declaim themselves into posts and powers upon an empty shadow, and yet have introduced into the constitution a real substance of that very danger? The argument against a standing-army, I am sorry to say it, is more antiquated than it is unjust. The preamble to the mutiny-bill expresses a standing-army to be inconsistent with the liberties of this country. What was the argument the right honourable gentleman and his friends built upon this? If a standing-army, said they, is (as it certainly is)

is) dangerous to liberty, let us have a militia.

This lure of a militia was hung out, or toss'd about, for several years, and the public adopted it with the utmost raptures. Little, however, did they know what it meant ; and that the whole boasted patriot's scheme of militia, in contradistinction to a standing-army, must end in rendering that militia, to all intents and purposes, a standing-army subject to that very military command which the right honourable gentleman and his friends had, for almost twenty years, exclaimed against ; and I may defy any man alive to define it, excepting the duration of service (and even in that there is some ambiguity)—what the difference is between a standing-army and our present militia. Both are equally subject to that military law, which the right honourable gentleman and his friends so often condemned, as being inconsistent with the liberties of this nation.

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Having said thus much, my Lord, I think myself obliged to clear myself from all imputation of being an enemy to a militia, or even to a standing-army ; because I sincerely think that the officers and leaders of neither can ever be brought into any schemes that are destructive to the country. All I mean to shew is, that the public ought to lay no manner of dependence upon the hackneyed topics of opposition ; and that even the right honourable gentleman himself and his friends now laugh at the credulity of the public, in believing a single word of those professions they made use of to raise themselves into power.

But I shall now desist from combating a phantom, for such was their public spirit, and proceed to realities. The next period of our late negotiation was, when the French king had conquered the unaccountable omission of two principals in the war against the king of Prussia, and had brought his allies to consent to the

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negotiation going forward. My Lord, I am far from being an advocate for the sincerity of the French court; but I cannot help thinking that it is most sincerely well disposed in favour of its own interests; and that, at the period I now treat of, viz. the 26th of March, 1761, the interests of both nations were the same. France had lost so much by the war that she wanted to conclude it, and we had gained so much by it that we ought to have done the same. Matters appeared in another light to our minister; and his conduct was such as demonstrated that he thought the interest of Great Britain was placed, not upon a commercial or civil, but on a military foundation. The boasts of France, of having conquered the island of Minorca, of being in possession of Hanau and the landgraviate of Hesse, with the town of Gottingen, were not only ridiculous, but plain demonstrations of her impotence. Some allowances, however, ought to have been made to her desire of maintaining

maintaining her importance, as a capital state in Europe. My Lord, I can see no manner of impropriety in indulging her with a little tinsel, provided we could secure to ourselves that which, of all things, ought to be considered as most precious to a trading people, a safe and an honourable peace. But it seems even that gewgaw tinsel must be ript off. Our minister, conscious of his insignificancy, should he mingle with the dregs of the people, that is, with those who reason coolly and soberly on the advantages of peace to a trading nation, caught at every circumstance to break off the negotiation.

I shall, my Lord, admit that France was unreasonable in insisting as she did, upon rendering the empress-queen the mistress of Wesel and Gueldres; but was her obstinacy in this respect to be put in competition with the blessings which peace must have brought to this nation, and the quiet possession of all, I may say, that we have *really* gained in this war. Was

the right honourable gentleman to employ all the declamatory power he is possessed of, in blazoning out his impropriety of submitting to such terms, the whole could not amount to the hundredth part of the expence we have been at in rejecting them.

I shall now, my Lord, take the liberty to proceed to a third period of the treaty in question : but I must beg leave to lay out of it all mention of epochs and *uti possideatis* ; terms which both our minister and that of France knew extremely well signified nothing ; and which they made use of only to amuse or puzzle the understandings of the people whom they wanted to guide. On the 19th of April, 1761, the French king intimates that his Britannic majesty (and I dare to say there was some foundation for his intelligence) agreed that the nature of the objects which had occasioned the war between France and England was totally foreign from the disputes which had given rise to

to the war in Germany. Now, my Lord, if his Britannic majesty was candid enough to admit of that simple, that undeniable, proposition, where, in the name of common sense, was the justice or propriety of admitting a single German consideration into the negociation? We did not connect ourselves with Prussia on account of our American concerns; they had not the smallest regard to the ballance of power in Germany. Had Great Britain taken France at her word, and said to her, Let us put the consideration of the German war out of the question, and settle our American affairs, where could have been the harm of such a proceeding to us; unless the saving twenty millions of money is to be reckoned amongst our misfortunes? But, says the right honourable gentleman's friends, it would be dishonourable in us to desert our ally, his Prussian majesty. To this I answer, it is more dishonourable for us to desert ourselves, and to abandon every principle of
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our interest, liberty, or constitution. In what sense can we be said to desert *him*, in putting an end to a war to which he never had, and never can have, the smallest relation? This, my Lord, is the plain state of the case, and all the torrent of popular phrenzy never can overthrow it. There is not a writer or speaker in England, who has had the courage to review our late negotiation for peace, in a mild, calm, light. They who have defended our minister, think that he could not do less than reject it; they who blame him, think he did too much in the concessions he made.

My Lord, I am bold enough to say that had he struck the bargain offered him by France, he would have done neither too much nor too little. And, however, he might have sacrificed a foolish, immaterial, unmeaning punctilio or two, he would have stuck to the solid interest of this nation. Can any man, my Lord, of sober sense imagine, that his Britannic majesty

majesty was in honour obliged to adopt the quarrel in which he never was engaged ? Can the highest strained vein of politics pretend that, even supposing we had settled our American disputes with France, his Prussian majesty would have had the smallest handle for complaining of a breach of the treaty subsisting between them ? The very preamble to that treaty implies, that it is for granting his Prussian majesty speedy and powerful assistance ; but where ; not surely in America ? Our treaty with him had not the least regard to our disputes with France upon that continent. Had we consulted the spirit of the treaty, we must have known, and so must the French have known to their cost, that our finishing our American disputes was the greatest advantage that could have accrued to the king of Prussia ; and, my Lord, I am sorry to say, that I am afraid our not finishing them has ruined him.

Had our minister had nothing in his eye but a steady attachment to the honour and interest of his country, he could not have deliberated for one instant between the continuance of war, at the immense real expence we are now at, and the conclusion of peace at the imaginary expence of what can scarcely deserve the name of a punctilio. It soon appeared that the duration of war was not sufficient for his purposes, unless it was likewise extended; and we must grapple with Spain as well as with France. I shall not here recapitulate what I said in my last, on the subject of a Spanish war; but I must be of opinion, that we enter at present into it, if we are about to enter into it, with infinite disadvantages.

Spain, my Lord, has not for these hundred years past been near so powerful as she is at present, if we consider the three particulars that constitute national power, I mean her land army, her fleet, and her finances. It may be said, and I shall not dispute

dispute it, that our fleet is far superior to hers; but we are to reflect that, considering our national debt, our means for supporting that fleet are far inferior; unless we have a mind to plunge ourselves into a national bankruptcy. This must be the consequence, should we continue the war at the same expence we now are at, even supposing, what can by no means be admitted, that a war with Spain will not, while that with France continues, be attended with any additional expence. Had we, while fresh and fasting, as the saying is, entered into a Spanish war, and I can by no means see that the same reasons for it, did not subsist then, as much as they do now, the case had been very different, and it is more than probable, that we might have made the Spaniards defray the expences of both wars. But he must be a novice in politics who does not know that Spain never makes a claim, that she never gives a surly look, or a harsh answer, before the arrival of her treasure

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from America. Even the insolent memorial which was so contemptuously, and, I think, justly returned by our minister to Mons. Buffy, who presented it, did not provoke the court of Madrid into any indecent resentment. Far from that, the Spanish minister at London cloaked all under the mask of candor and sincerity. The reason, my Lord, is plain, it was because they had not then got home their plate-fleet and galleons from America. Had the case been otherwise with them, they would have spoken the very language that their ambassador the count de Fuentes spoke before he left England, in his famous memorial, an insult so gross to the crown of Great Britain, that nothing but its not being authentically contradicted, could induce me to believe it genuine.

But, my Lord, tho' moderation and decency are necessary observances amongst great states, yet I cannot help doing one piece of justice to our late minister, by
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acknowledging that we ought to have begun to talk in a peremptory tone to the court of Madrid sooner than we did. The restitution of the captures she claimed was highly insolent; because the legality of them was to be determined by laws that are uncommon to all nations. His Britannic majesty had it not in his power to comply with such demands; because, if the captures were legal, they were the property of his subjects. If they were illegal, they must be restored, in course, to the subjects of Spain, without the intervention of that court. The privilege claimed for the Spanish nation, for fishing upon the banks of Newfoundland, is so insolent, that one can scarcely think it was made in earnest. It is true, in the 15th article of the treaty of Utrecht, between Great Britain and Spain, mention is made that the Guipuscoans pretend to certain rights of fishing at Newfoundland; and it is agreed that all such privileges as they, and other

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people of Spain are able to claim by right shall be allowed to them. But, my Lord, though I think this to be the most indefensible article, in that or any other treaty, concluded at that time ; yet I think, at present, the meaning of is next to nothing, as it never was heard, that the Guipuscoans, or any other people of Spain, had been able to make out this pretended unheard-of claim. It is true, that the liberty of fishing upon the banks of Newfoundland would be a very pretty perquisite to Spain, because it would furnish out all the tables of that kingdom, for almost half the year ; but it is as true, a claim does not establish a right ; and they might, with equal justice, have demanded the arsenal of the tower of London to be delivered up to them.

The next demand of the Spaniards, I mean that for demolishing the English settlements in the bay of Honduras, is equally unjust and unreasonable ; unless
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they can prove, what they never have attempted to do, the right of pre-occupancy to be in their favour ; whereas, we have proved it, as far as the nature of the thing can admit of, to be in ours.

But, my Lord, all those claims of the Spaniards are founded in the capital maxims of their monarchy, which we ought long ago to have disputed and destroyed. It is true, we entered into the last war with them entirely upon the principle of our being exempted from all kinds of search on the open seas ; but we never have been able in express terms to obtain from them an acknowledgement of that exemption. But, on a review of treaties, have we no other demands upon Spain ; and, why ought we not to enter our claims in return ? The exclusive right of the Spaniards to the commerce with their own settlements in America is by the eighth article of the treaty of Utrecht established by common consent as a fundamental rule ; the same article provides

provides, “ That no licence shall at any time be given to the French, or any other nations to introduce negroes, goods, merchandize, or any things whatsoever, into the Spanish American dominions.”

And, “ It is futher agreed, that none of the Spanish dominions in America shall ever be alienated from the crown of Spain, to the French, or other nation.”

Have those stipulations been observed by Spain, or rather has she not grossly violated every one of them? Do not the French, at this very time, openly trade to her American colonies; and has she not put them in actual possession of one half of the island of St. Domingo, by which they have been enabled to insult and distress the British navigation?

I should be glad to know, why, during the course of this ruinous war with France, our late minister, who could with such spirit resent the delivery of a silly ridiculous paper, did not talk with the Spaniards concerning those monstrous violations

violations of treaties, in which this nation is so capitally interested? Far from that, we winked at them out of tenderness to Spain, and we even boggled at seizing French property, when bound either to or from St. Domingo. What is still more extraordinary and incredible is, that, for many months past, there has not been a single memorial presented on our parts, complaining of those infractions ; so that, it is very possible, the court of Spain now construes our acquiescence into a right to themselves. What constructions can be put upon such an acquiescence, so long continued with our eyes open, and so suddenly interrupted, but that our minister found it convenient for him to make that a pretext for retiring from a post he no longer could hold with safety? To pretend, in general terms, that Spain had already done things that were prejudicial to Great-Britain, was childish and nugatory. Why were not those things specified?

and, why did not our minister manfully say, “I cannot, I will not, hold a place in the government, so long as Spain keeps up pretensions, and observes a conduct, inconsistent with the faith of treaties?” Five hundred detentions, my Lord, such as that of the Antigallican privateer, and a thousand Spaniards sailing under French colours, were not of equal importance with the explicit clearing up a single right that belongs to us by treaty. An apology for the forwardness of a governor; a check given to a captain, or commander; are looked upon amongst nations as sufficient atonements for temporary offences; and, if our gazette does not misinform us, such atonements have been accepted of, and that too very lately. But, my Lord, we have, upon record in the English history, a precedent of one of the greatest men this nation ever produced, having lost his head upon a scaffold, for being guilty of what was construed to be a violation of the treaties

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genuously and impartially speaking, I know not of a single treaty, now subsisting between Spain and us, that the subjects of Spain think themselves bound by, with regard to their and our American commerce, the capital point of consequence between us. Can it be said, that the article of *Uti Possidetis*, which is the third in the American treaty, is binding upon Spain, while she insists upon our abandoning our logwood settlements, which we were undeniably in possession of before that treaty was concluded? Can it be pretended, that we have the smallest benefit from the article stipulating that we shall have a free navigation from one of our own colonies to another, while the court of Spain has never directly given up her claims of searching our ships, and confiscating their cargoes, upon the American seas, which she, in fact, pretends to be all within her dominions? What benefit can we reap by the stipulation that provides for the exclusion

exclusion of the French, and other nations from trading with the Spanish settlements in America, while the Spaniards lay down as a principle, that they have a right to break through those stipulations, and to give to the French there what indulgences they shall find proper? Has not both France and Spain of late avowed that Great-Britain has no right to interfere in any such indulgences? Have not even the Dutch entered their claims to a free navigation and commerce with the Spanish and French West-Indies, provided they can obtain licences from the courts of Madrid and Versailles for that purpose?

These are points, my Lord, of too serious, too national, a concern, to be blended with the case of any minister, not even of the great one who lately resigned the seals of his office. They ought to stand on the footing of their own importance, and on that only. Let us, therefore, suppose all ministerial con-

siderations to be out of the question. But, how is Great Britain then to proceed ? My Lord, if it could have been done with honour, and consistently with her own safety, she ought to have avoided going to war with Spain ; but, as she is driven to that disagreeable necessity, she ought never to put up the sword, till she obliges Spain to a peace, which may prevent her from ever being under the necessity of again drawing it, on account of her commerce, which is the only account that can create any difference between the two nations. Since I took the pen in my hand, a war with Spain has been declared ; but that declaration does not in the smallest degree operate towards my altering what I have had the honour to lay before your lordship. It rather impels the expediency both of blaming and bewailing the conduct, that rendered such a war a necessary measure on the part of Great-Britain, at so critical a time. Had they, whom

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the right honourable gentleman differed with, been as lavish of their appeals to the world, or as forward in publishing them ; or had they thought that such appeals were consistent with their services, as privy-counsellors to his majesty, and the nation, a very different scene, long before this time, would have been exhibited. The juncture, or to use the modern term, the epoch is now elapsed, that rendered such a silence expedient in point of decency, and necessary in point of duty. It would then have appeared that such of his majesty's servants, as have been branded for their tameness, I will not say by whom ; (for I cannot yet prevail with myself to believe the right honourable gentleman to be the author of the letter published under his name,) because they differed in opinion from him and his brother, did not do it from any over cautious dispositions they wanted to entertain towards Spain, but as to the manner in which those dispositions were

were to be expressed. There was not at that board a member, and I appeal to your lordship for the truth of what I say, who discovered the smallest hesitation as to declaring war, if the Spaniards should insist upon their iniquitous demands. It was agreed by all, that those demands gave too propable an appearance of the existence of a treaty to our prejudice between France and Spain. That the disclaiming those terms was the strongest proof that such a treaty did not exist; and that their giving an equivocal answer to a formal demand made by our minister, as to the reality of that treaty, was the surest evidence of their intending not only to insist upon their demands, but to hurt us in our most important concerns ; and if such was the case, it was unanimously agreed not to defer the declaration a single moment.

The difference therefore, my Lord, was, whether by our proceeding regularly, we should proceed the less rapidly ?
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whether our conduct should be firm or flashy ? whether we should deprive Spain of all pretences, as we now have done, of appealing to the rest of the powers of Europe, and of charging us with piracy, and breach of faith ; or leave her at liberty to make hers the common cause of every civilized nation, I had almost said of humanity itself ?

A war, a momentous war, is not to be conducted as some towns, my Lord, are taken, by a coup de main. The laws of nations have established regular approaches, and the more regular they are made, the success has always been found the greater. Moderation is no enemy to vigour, and *suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*, has always been an approved maxim, not only by the ablest statesmen, but the greatest generals. I do not mean by this, to insinuate that we were to dally with the Spaniards ; but I think we are right in rendering their conduct inexcusable. The people of Great Britain, my Lord,
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think more for themselves than any people in the world, perhaps, than all the people in the world do ; and they have a better right to do so, because they pay dearer than any other people ever did, for that inestimable privilege. Our public treaties with Spain give no countenance to a coup de main war, and what must our public have thought, had the government not only plunged them into such a war, but had neglected every previous measure that establishes the difference between warrantable hostilities and illegal piracies ? Had such a war been entered into, and, as nothing is impossible in war, had its commencement been unsuccessful on our part, would the right honourable gentleman and his brother have stepped forth and said to the people and parliament of Great Britain, “ We alone are to blame, our credit carried at the C——l B——d the manner of making this war, in opposition to the sentiments of his majesty, and the sense of his ministry ? ”

stry? I say, my Lord, is it consistent with common sense, to suppose that they would have made such a declaration? On the other hand, what a pitiful figure must the rest of his majesty's servants have made in vindicating themselves; if all they could alledge in their own defence was, that fifty or sixty of them were over-ruled by two of their own number? And yet had they not made that defence, the indignation, and perhaps the vengeance, of the public must have fallen equally on the whole board, as was in a great measure the case with those who acquiesced in the partition-treaty, and those who went with the majority, even of parliament, in that of Utrecht.

But, my Lord, how did the case actually stand between the right honourable gentleman and his opponents? He had guided the affairs of the nation near six years. Was his quarrel with Spain a sudden eruption, like those of *Ætna* or *Vesuvius*? Was it but of yesterday's standing? Then, undoubtedly, there was the

more reason for caution and regularity on our part; because, whatever we may imagine, a rupture with Spain is not so desirable an event at present, as the right honourable gentleman and his friends want to represent it. If, as I believe, it really was the case, Spain has been hoarding up her wrath, and laying up her materials for war, during all the time of the right honourable gentleman's administration? why did he not, four years ago, take the resolution that he has put in practice within these four months? It is no secret to the public, that the nature of his department, in the administration, made him the only minister who was in possession of all the secrets of our affairs with Spain. What adds to the misfortune of the public is, that no council under that of the great council of the nation, had a right, without his majesty's order, to demand those secrets from him. Therefore, tho' a secretary of state, if like the right honourable gentleman, he is a first minister, after he lays an event, a
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transaction, or a measure before the C—l B—d, has no more vote than any other member there, as to this decision, yet he has it in his own breast, without an absolute command from his majesty to the contrary, whether he shall, or shall not, submit the matter to their judgment. And this, my Lord, brings me to a period very similar to the present.

Four and twenty years ago we had a first minister, who, though no secretary of state, possessed an absolute and uncontrollable power in the government. This first minister's plan of government, my Lord, was as pacific as that of his successor was warlike, and yet both pursued their ends in the same manner. Sir R. W. corresponded personally with our ambassador at Spain, who, to our misfortune, was a very weak minister, and kept not only the parliament, but the council board, in the dark, as to all the shocking things the Spaniards were carrying on to our prejudice, because he knew if they were known here, he could not prevent

a war. My Lord, I should be sorry if any of his successors in ministerial power, have rendered our transactions with Spain equally impenetrable, in order to prevent a peace. It happened, however, that Geraldino, the Spanish minister here, took all opportunities of declaring that Sir R. W. was imposing upon the public, and that his master had no such pacific intentions. The nation believed Geraldino sooner than they did Sir R. W. and at last he was driven into a war, by which he lost his post and his power, but gained a pension, and a title in his family.

Tho', for very different purposes, the like conduct seems lately to have been pursued, I will venture to say, neither the public, nor the parliament, nor even the rest of the king's servants, till the disease was past remedy, received that information concerning our differences with Spain, as could enlighten and enable them to proceed in a path, which might have led to the end of those differences ; which was far from being impracticable, had

had the matter been taken up in time. The cry of No search, which the nation adopted at the beginning of the last war with Spain, was a strong stubborn principle, and obstinately disputed on both sides ; and yet, though the Spaniards never could be brought formally and sincerely to give up the point, it has scarcely ever been mentioned since the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The demand of satisfaction for captures of Spanish ships is childish and trifling, because it is well known, that it does not depend upon his majesty or our court ; for, if such satisfaction is due, it must be obtained in a legal regular method, which is open to the Spaniards, as well as all the other nations of Europe. The very mention of their demand for liberty to fish on the banks of Newfoundland is ridiculous, and proves them not to have been sincere in making it. The dispute about the logwood trade has subsisted these two hundred years ; and, though I am far from saying, that a British minister

nister could give up our rights in the bay of Honduras, yet I cannot think it ought to have been beneath the attention of any minister to have entered upon a negotiation for regulating that trade.

Now, my Lord, I must be free enough to say, that I think two periods existed, during the right honourable gentleman's administration, of very different natures. The first was, *when they would, and we would not.* The second, *when we would, and they would not.* They would have compromised all differences with us, before his catholic majesty's accession to that crown, when his predecessor and his ministry were well inclined to England; when the ill state of their king's health enfeebled their government; when we were fifty millions less in debt than we are at present; when the affairs of our great ally on the continent wore a promising aspect; and when our successes must have daunted any other nation from embracing their cause, or abetting their injustice.

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It is plain the alteration of the situations has altered their conduct ; they, and all Europe, believe that if England should continue the war for a few years, she must run into an inevitable national bankruptcy. They are convinced, at the same time, that his Prussian majesty, in the vineyard of whose cause we have so faithfully laboured, totters on the brink of perdition. They know that France, far from being in the desperate state that she has been represented in, by the right honourable gentleman and his friends, is through the plenty of the seasons, and the loyalty of her subjects, who are more disgusted with the haughtiness of our minister's personal behaviour than with the steadiness of his political conduct, is at this very time, in a better condition to continue the war, than she has been any time within these two years past. Spain has a formidable army, and a respectable navy. Though France did undoubtedly make a most unnatural conjunction with the court of Vienna, yet she

she has gained one great point by it, which is, that by introducing the Russians into the empire, she has obtained a powerful check upon the court of Vienna and the Germanic empire, if she should again break with the house of Austria, an event, which is perhaps not so distant as some may imagine ; for it must take place the moment the king of Prussia is stripped of Silesia. I could perhaps mention some matters of a more domestic concern, which would heighten this picture.

Our commercial concerns with Portugal, next to those with our own colonies, are undoubtedly the most considerable we have ; in what a condition, my Lord, must they be, if that prince should have no alternative but that of opposing in the field an army of 30,000 Spaniards, or taking shelter under the cannon of our ships. It is certain, that his frontiers are unprovided for resistance ; that he has not in all Portugal 15,000 troops ; that the affection of his subjects, through the
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severity, if not barbarity, of his ministers, are most miserably alienated from his government; and that Spain has a powerful party in the very heart of his capital.

Such being the case, what a comfortable prospect have we on that side, when instead of receiving from Portugal a million yearly on the balance of our trade, we may expect that trade to be in the hands of our enemies, and England once more giving refuge to an exiled king of Portugal? It is true, that during the late war, the crown of Portugal remained neutral, and our trade to it still continued; but what, my Lord, was that owing to, but to the ambition of the queen-mother of Spain, who no longer governs there? The Italian war; by which she obtained a kingdom for one of her sons, and a dutchy for another, and during the continuance of that war, from first to last, it cost Spain above 150,000 lives, besides most immense treasures. But to close this uncomfortable prospect, we are to remember that it is possible, at this very time,

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the island of Minorca, which gave us such decisive advantages in our differences with that crown, is again in the hands of the Spaniards.

Now, my Lord, though I am far from insinuating that those are considerations which ought to operate at present, yet they ought certainly to have operated before matters were reduced to extremities; in which case we could easily have cooled the courage of our new enemies. To mention but one particular; why were not the grievances we suffered from Spain, and which are mentioned by the right honourable gentleman, in his famous letter, as the cause of his resignation because they were not redressed, laid before the parliament and the public, that we might have obtained a categorical answer before the arrival of her treasures from America? I believe it would puzzle the right honourable gentleman and his friends, to give a tolerable reason for this omission. I know they say, that the reason why Mr. P. resigned is justified by our declar-
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ing war with Spain ; but that is saying nothing at all, unless he can prove that he again and again endeavoured to make his late and his present majesty, their parliament, and their council, sensible that a war with Spain, was inevitable, unless we could reduce her to justice and moderation. It is evident that till within at most two months before the right honourable gentleman's resignation, the necessity of a rupture with Spain never was dreamed of, by the people or parliament of England, or, I believe known to any British subject, but the right honourable gentleman himself.

The next consideration, my Lord, that must affect a British subject, upon the approaching rupture, is the case of the Dutch. Their barrier may be said to be now no more. Little of her marine power remains ; and if France, assisted by Spain, should demand their abandoning their neutrality, what can they do ? I know what they ought to do, and what perhaps would be the wisest thing they could do,

to join themselves to Great Britain with spirit and vigour. But have we any reason to believe from the temper and dispositions of the present governing party in Holland, that that will be the case ? I am afraid not. I am far from being under any great alarms as to the prejudice, which the power of Holland by sea and land, could do us, even if she should declare against us. But what must be the consequence to our public credit, upon which, I may say the existence of this nation depends ? Could it support the Dutch withdrawing from it, all that they have in our funds ? Could it withstand the shock it must receive from the stagnation of all commercial intercourse between the subjects of Great-Britain and Holland.

In short, my Lord, I am one of the very few, who think that the Dutch being forced to declare against us, would, tho' they never should strike a stroke, be the most fatal event that could happen to this kingdom, the French having so easy an access as they have to their country.

try. It is therefore, my Lord, natural to enquire, whether the right honourable gentleman, during his administration, had it in his power to have finished one war for us before we were plunged into another. It is certain that the count de Fuentes, during the negotiation, asserted that he had. In the note delivered by him to Mr. P. No. 24, of the Historical Memorial, he says, that, “His Catholic majesty will always be pleased, whenever he sees that they make that progress, which he has ever desired, in the negotiation of peace? whether it be separate between France and England, or general; as his sincere wishes are to make it perpetual, by obviating every source which might hereafter, unhappily, renew the war.” In the memorial the same minister left behind him, when he left England, he is still more explicit; for he there says, that, “His Catholic majesty wrote to his cousin, the most Christian king, that since the junction of the affairs of Spain obstructed in England the intended

tended peace, he would rather abandon the same, than lay the least obstacle thereto."

Now, my Lord, supposing those facts to be true, and they have never yet been contradicted, was it worth our while, for the sake of those few unimportant points, or rather punctilios, that broke off the treaty between us and France, not only to continue our war with her, but to enter into a new one with Spain, who comes, as we may say, fresh and fasting, into the field ; *nitidus atque inunctus in arenam descendit*. France, my Lord, can do a great deal with Spain. Spain can do very little without France.

It may be said, that supposing we had made a peace with France, the Spanish claims still lay over our heads, and that they were still unrelinquished by her. There let them lie ; so long as she was detached from France, we had nothing to fear from them. But I foresee, I may be called upon, to reconcile the doctrine I have here laid down, of the first letter I had the honour to address to your lordship,

ship, with what I have said above. I have there (page 57, *et seq.*) said, “that the Spaniards, in a war with England, had every thing to fear, and nothing to hope for; and that England could maintain a war against both the crowns, with as little expence as she is at with one.” My Lord, I am still of that opinion, if we simply consider the operations of the war; but the consequences of it give it a very different complexion.

I am proud, my Lord, before I close this letter, to reflect that I have the honour of being countenanced in all its contents, by no less than royal authority. His majesty's declaration of war against Spain, confirms every word I have advanced, with regard to the merits of the right honourable gentleman, in abdicating his post; because we did not proceed in a manner that is thought barbarous amongst barbarians. A word and a blow is the description of impatient resentment; but his impatience was such, that the word was to be emitted, and the
2 blow

blow to take place; a conduct which his majesty tells us, he was bound in justice and prudence to forbear, especially as the profound diffimulation of the Spanish court, and the declarations of their ministers, presented no handle for coming to extremities. As matters have turned out, Spain, in fact, is the party who has first declared war, upon the false and foolish pretence that war was declared by the fair and friendly application of our ministers, to know the truth of a prevailing report. The right honourable gentleman's friends may now set their wits to work, in comparing his conduct with that of his majesty, and the rest of the council. Let them prove that a single moment has been lost, except that which was due to those forms that are so indispensable amongst nations, that they are thought to be indispensable to justice.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient
humble Servant.

F I N I S.

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The

The Right Hon. Lord Lyttelton, in his *Dialogues of the Dead*, p. 318, says “ In the character of Sir Charles Grandison is a noble
“ pattern of every private virtue, with sentiments so exalted as to ren-
“ der him equal to every public duty.”

Mr. Johnson, author of the *Rambler*, speaks of Mr. Richardson in the following manner, “ He has enlarged the knowledge of human
“ nature, and taught the passions to move at the command of virtue.”
See N^o. 97 of the *Rambler*.

Mr. Warton has the following remarkable passage, relative to a character in Sir Charles Grandison, “ Of all representations of madness,
“ that of Clementina, in the History of Sir Charles Grandison, is the
“ most deeply interesting. I know not whether even the madness of
“ Lear is wrought up, and expressed, by so many little strokes of na-
“ ture and genuine passion. It is absolute pedantry to prefer and
“ compare the madness of Orestes in Euripides, to this of Clemen-
“ tina.” Warton’s *Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope*, p. 276.

The reputation of the author of Sir Charles Grandison is far from being confined to his own country; he has been read in many of the languages, and known to most of the nations of Europe; and has been greatly admired, notwithstanding every dissimilitude of manners, or every disadvantage of translation. Several writers abroad, where no prepossession in his favour could possibly take place, have expressed the high sense which they entertained of the merit of his works. Diderot, one of the present most celebrated French authors, speaking of the means employed to move the passions, in the 96th page of his essay on dramatic poetry, mentions Richardson particularly as a perfect master of that art: “ How strong,” says he, “ how sensible, how
“ pathetic his descriptions! his personages, though silent, are alive
“ before me; and of those who speak, the actions are still more af-
“ fecting than the words.” The famous Rousseau of Geneva, speaking, in his letter to Monsieur d’Alembert, of Mr. Richardson’s novels, asserts, “ that nothing was ever written equal, or even approaching to
“ them, in any language.”

We could almost fill a volume with commendations of this work from different authors, but the great names abovementioned are fully sufficient, were any recommendation wanting, to entitle it to the public favour.

